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INTRODUCTION 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank) has been stretching the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s resources dangerously thin—to the extent 
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that the securities rule-maker has had to abandon some pressing 
matters (filling crucial job openings) to address others 
(promulgating 105 rules, conducting more than twenty studies, and 
creating five new offices).1  Common sense dictates that in a time of 
financial crisis, the last thing the government would want to do is 
undercapitalize and overburden one of its financial watch-dog 
agencies.  Recent invalidations of Commission rules show that this is 
indeed what Dodd-Frank has exacerbated, demonstrating that the 
agency needs to refocus.2 
In a recent invalidation, Business Roundtable v. SEC,3 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
invalidated Rule 14a-11, which would have required public 
companies to publish certain shareholders’ director nominations in 
proxy statements.4  A proxy statement is a required statement filed in 
advance of the annual meeting when a U.S. company solicits 
shareholder votes.5  The purpose of a proxy statement is to “promote 
‘the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders’ by ensuring 
that proxies would be solicited with ‘explanation to the stockholder 
of the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote 
is sought.’”6  Although the Commission could have appealed the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision, the Commission formally announced on 
September 7, 2011, that it would not seek immediate review.7  The 
court’s tabling of the constitutional issues8 raised in Business 
                                                          
 1. See Bill Swindell, SEC Stretched Thin by New Rules, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 19, 2010), 
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1010/101910cdpm3.htm (quoting Chairman 
Schapiro as indicating that the Commission had to “shift[] resources from other 
areas that . . . are equally deserving of [the Commission’s] time and attention” and 
that the Commission overall was “really resource constrained” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 2. See Diane Katz, Proxy Access Rule:  Appeals Court Rejects SEC Regulation, THE 
HERITAGE FOUND. (July 26, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/ 
07/proxy-access-rule-appeals-court-rejects-sec-regulation#_edn2 (recounting that 
courts have recently invalidated at least three other Commission rules because the 
Commission failed to adequately analyze the costs and benefits of the rules’ 
implementation). 
 3. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 4. Id. at 1147. 
 5. Proxy Statement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
proxy.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2012). 
 6. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
73-1383, at 14 (1934); S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 12 (1934)). 
 7. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary 
L. Schapiro on Proxy Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/press/2011/2011-179.htm (explaining that the Commission will “‘learn from 
the Court’s objections,’” indicating that the Commission took the court’s harsh 
criticisms as final and would not seek review). 
 8. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156 (declaring that the Commission acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously and noting that, “[a]ccordingly, [the court had] no 
occasion to address the petitioners’ First Amendment challenge to the rule”).  
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Roundtable puts the Commission in an uncomfortable position:  the 
Commission can start over and craft a new 14a-11-type rule that 
accounts for a cost-benefit analysis, but those efforts may ultimately 
be struck down based on a First Amendment challenge.  The D.C. 
Circuit lambasted the Commission for failing—yet again—to 
adequately analyze the cost-benefit analysis of a proposed rule;9 but 
solving the cost-benefit problem would not necessarily mean that the 
rest of the Commission’s reasoning was sound.  This dilemma could 
cost the Commission—and the average American taxpayer—
significant amounts of money and time.10 
This Note argues that had the D.C. Circuit reached the First 
Amendment issue in its analysis, the Commission would have learned 
that any such mandatory proxy access rule will not withstand strict 
scrutiny.  In particular, this Note contends that even if the 
Commission can provide economic support for a new version of Rule 
14a-11, so long as the rule requires mandatory proxy access,11 the rule 
would be subject to strict scrutiny and thus would fail that review 
because the Commission would be unable to show a compelling 
interest or narrow tailoring.  Part I provides the context surrounding 
Rule 14a-11 and briefly explains the corporate First Amendment 
jurisprudence under which any new version of the rule would be 
analyzed.  Part II discusses the First Amendment implications of Rule 
14a-11’s possible successor and argues that any subsequent Rule 14a-
11 attempts will fail under the strict scrutiny analysis that would be 
applied.  This Note concludes by recommending that the 
Commission not waste its resources on replacing Rule 14a-11 because 
the successor rule would fail strict scrutiny and be declared 
unconstitutional. 
                                                          
Petitioners argued that requiring publication of a shareholder’s director 
nominations violates a corporation’s First Amendment rights.  Opening Brief of 
Petitioners at 55, Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014800, at 
*55. 
 9. See Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148–49 (blaming the Commission for 
“opportunistically” characterizing certain costs and failing to address other costs 
without explanation).   
 10. See Noam Noked, Implications of the Proxy Access Case, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Aug. 23, 2011, 9:15 
AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/08/23/implications-of-the-proxy-
access-case/#more-20347 (positing that any further universal access rulemaking “will 
have to be accompanied by substantial economic analysis that may be beyond the 
resources that the agency can reasonably expend on any one rulemaking”). 
 11. Throughout this Note, all references to a “Rule 14a-11-type rule,” “Rule 14a-
11 successor,” or the like assume a rule that still requires universal mandatory proxy 
access with no out, but has been properly analyzed and supported by the 
Commission under the required cost-benefit analysis.  
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I. BACKGROUND:  FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE CORPORATION 
AND A HISTORY OF RULE 14a-11 
The Commission passed Rule 14a-11 in a 3-2 decision in August 
2010 after an arduous fourteen months of deliberation and sifting 
through over 500 sharply-divided comment letters.12  Had it been 
enacted without challenge, Rule 14a-11 would have allowed an 
individual shareholder, or group of shareholders, to include a 
nominee of the shareholder’s choice in a public company’s proxy 
statement in certain instances.13  A Shareholder could file a Schedule 
14N14 and provide a copy of their nomination to the company if the 
shareholder owned at least three percent of the voting power entitled 
to vote in the election of directors, had held that power for at least 
three years, and intended to continue to own these securities through 
the upcoming director election.15  Business Roundtable, an 
association comprised of chief executive officers of leading U.S. 
companies, challenged the implementation of Rule 14a-11; the 
Commission temporarily stayed the use of Rule 14a-11 and its sister 
rule, Rule 14a-8.16 
Under the amendments to Rule 14a-8, public companies would no 
longer be able to exclude a shareholder’s proposal to establish a rule 
in a company’s governing documents guaranteeing inclusion of one 
or more shareholders’ director nominations in the proxy statement.17  
Rule 14a-8 would thus allow shareholders to accomplish 
independently what Rule 14a-11 would require of companies:  to 
include certain shareholders’ director nominations in proxy 
materials.18 
                                                          
 12. Jeffrey McCracken & Kara Scannell, Fight Brews as Proxy-Access Nears:  
Companies Race to Derail or Soften SEC Plan; ‘Ultimate Vehicle’ for Activists, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 26, 2009, at C1. 
 13. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
 14. A Schedule 14N is a document submitted to the SEC disclosing, among other 
things, information surrounding the length of ownership and the shareholder’s 
voting power. 
 15. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,674–77 
(summarizing how a shareholder could invoke Rule 14a-11). 
 16. In re Bus. Roundtable, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act Release 
No. 63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010 WL 3862548 (Oct. 4, 
2010) (granting stay).  The rules had been scheduled to become effective November 
15, 2010.  Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 
9151, Exchange Act Release No. 63,109, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29,462, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,641, 64,641 (Oct. 20, 2010). 
 17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
 18. Compare Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 
56,674–77 (summarizing the amendments to Rule 14a-11 that would compel all 
public companies to publish the director nominations of certain shareholder), with 
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In Business Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit struck down Rule 14a-11 on 
procedural grounds,19 but the court left Plaintiffs’ constitutional 
challenges untouched.20  The D.C. Circuit declared the rule invalid 
on the grounds that the Commission acted “arbitrarily and 
capriciously” by failing to assess the economic effects of Rule 14a-11.21  
However, Rule 14a-11 also implicates the First Amendment because 
corporations are legal persons that retain rights under the 
Constitution just as citizens do.22  Plaintiffs asserted that Rule 14a-11 
violated the First Amendment by compelling companies to publish 
third-party speech by including shareholder nominations in proxy 
materials.23  Plaintiffs further argued that companies could be 
required to do so even when a majority of shareholders oppose the 
nomination and even if the accompanying speech was false or 
misleading.24 
Under the First Amendment, groups and individuals usually are 
not required to speak or to carry the speech of a third party.25  In 
                                                          
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (prohibiting corporations from excluding shareholder 
proposals to include bylaws that would require the company to publish shareholder 
proxy nominations). 
 19. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 20. Id. at 1156. 
 21. Id. at 1148–49.  The court elaborated that the “arbitrary and capricious” 
conclusion was based on the Commission’s unjustified rosy outlook on the costs and 
benefits of the rule, its failure to quantify costs, its failure to support predictive 
judgments, and the inclusion of contradictory statements in the Rule.  Id.  The D.C. 
Circuit also strongly criticized the Commission’s application of the rule to investment 
companies, id. at 1154–56, but that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 22. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 706 (1819) 
(establishing the notion of corporate personhood in the United States); see also 1 
U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, . . . as well as 
individuals.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (“The Court has 
recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 23. Opening Brief of Petitioners at 55, Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1144 (No. 10-
1305), 2011 WL 2014800, at *55. 
 24. Id. at 56.  Under Rule 14a-11, companies would be required to publish 
information about, and the ability to vote for, a shareholder’s nominees for director.  
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, 
Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 
Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674–77 (Sept. 16, 2010).  The final rule makes clear that a 
shareholder will be liable for any false or misleading representations made in the 
Schedule 14N, but it does not prevent the possibility that the company could publish 
and circulate the materials before the false or misleading nature of the facts 
surrounding the director nomination becomes known.  Id. at 56,676. 
 25. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 241–42 (1977) 
(forbidding teachers’ union from using service charges required by non-union 
members to publish ideological views of the union); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705, 714 (1977) (holding that police could not prevent citizens from covering a 
portion of the state license plate reading “Live Free or Die” because the First 
Amendment afforded the individuals the right to hold an opinion different from the 
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Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission,26 the Supreme Court 
invalidated a state law requiring a gas and electric utility to carry the 
message of a third party on a newsletter sent to customers.27  Pacific 
Gas inserted a newsletter in its monthly bill to customers that 
included, among other subjects, political editorials.28  After a public 
consumer group requested that the Public Utilities Commission 
forbid distribution of editorials through the newsletter, the Utilities 
Commission instead required Pacific Gas to apportion space in its 
newsletter for use by the public consumer group four times a year, 
despite the group’s views being contrary to those of Pacific Gas.29  The 
third-party “[a]ccess” to the billing envelope was “limited to persons 
or groups . . . who disagree[d] with [the utility’s] views . . . and who 
oppose[d] [the utility] in” certain proceedings before the agency.30  
The plurality applied strict scrutiny and determined that the agency’s 
requirement of newsletter space for third parties burdened the 
utility’s “right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its 
own rights in order to ‘enhance the relative voice’ of its opponents.”31  
The Court ultimately declared the order invalid because it infringed 
on Pacific Gas’s freedom of speech by compelling the company to 
provide a forum for views in opposition to its own.32 
Content-based speech regulation requires courts to apply strict 
scrutiny—the most stringent standard of judicial review—to assess the 
constitutionality of a law.33  For a government action to pass strict 
scrutiny, it must:  (1) be justified by a compelling interest; (2) be 
narrowly tailored; and (3) be the least restrictive means for achieving 
the asserted goal.34  Courts have been reluctant to define what 
constitutes a compelling interest, but the concept generally applies to 
something necessary or crucial, not merely preferred.35  To be 
                                                          
majority). 
 26. 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 27. Id. at 6–7. 
 28. Id. at 5. 
 29. Id. at 6. 
 30. Id. at 13. 
 31. Id. at 14 (citation omitted). 
 32. Id. at 20–21. 
 33. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 462 (2009) 
(“[C]ontent-based restrictions must satisfy strict scrutiny, i.e., they must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”); see also Gabriel A. Feldman, 
The Misuse of the Less Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U. 
L. REV. 561, 592 (2009) (describing the method of review of an infringement of a 
fundamental right as “a maximizing test”). 
 34. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 817 (2000). 
 35. See, e.g., Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172 (2001) (characterizing admissions 
of guilt from valid Miranda waivers as not merely “‘desirable,’” but essential to serving 
society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing criminals); Bush v. 
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999 (1996) (“The simple question is whether the race-based 
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narrowly tailored, an action may not be overbroad36 or fail to address 
specific indispensable facets of the compelling interest.37 
II. A RULE COMPELLING PUBLICATION OF SHAREHOLDER PROXY 
NOMINATIONS VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF CORPORATIONS 
Even if the Commission creates a new 14a-11-like rule adjusted to 
comply with the procedural defects identified in Business Roundtable,38 
the new rule would violate the First Amendment.  Any rule that 
compels a public company to print and circulate shareholder 
nominations should be subject to strict scrutiny, and such a rule will 
necessarily fail that test because it would not serve a compelling 
interest, would not be narrowly tailored, and would not be the least 
restrictive means available for achieving the government’s interest.39 
A. Strict Scrutiny Applies Because Rule 14a-11 is a Content-Based 
Regulation of Corporate Speech 
Any regulation of the content of speech made by persons, 
individual or corporate, is subject to strict scrutiny if it is not based on 
reasonable time, place, and manner concerns.40  Rule 14a-11 
regulates the content of speech because it compels companies to 
carry and fund third-party speech with which the companies 
disagree.41  Creation of a rule aiming to increase proxy access that did 
not have universal scope would be redundant because shareholders 
                                                          
districting was reasonably necessary to serve a compelling interest.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 36. See Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(invalidating a law requiring a permit to engage in “expressive” activity in a national 
park because it was “overbroad” and therefore violated the First Amendment).  The 
overbreadth in Boardley derived from a regulation prohibiting the speech of a single 
pamphleteer in a “free speech area”:  an area where the government had little 
interest in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere.  Id. at 520–21. 
 37. See Maurice R. Dyson, When Government Is a Passive Participant in Private 
Discrimination:  A Critical Look at White Privilege & the Tacit Return to Interposition in Pics 
v. Seattle School District, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 150 (2008) (defining as “under-
inclusive” those laws that do not meet the requirements of strict scrutiny because 
they fail to address essential aspects of the compelling interest). 
 38. 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 39. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. at 813, 817 (defining the elements of strict 
scrutiny that an alternative Rule 14a-11 would have to satisfy). 
 40. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (holding that 
content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict scrutiny, while content-
neutral regulations are only subject to intermediate scrutiny). 
 41. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) 
(applying strict scrutiny to orders trying to compel companies to publish third-party 
information).  Additionally, if enacted, Rule 14a-11 could mandate the publication of 
speech that is false and misleading.  See Opening Brief of Petitioners, supra note 23, 
at 55. 
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already have the ability to implement mandatory proxy access at their 
discretion. 
Strict scrutiny applies to content-based regulations of speech, 
except in rare circumstances that involve lesser-protected categories, 
such as commercial speech.42  Rule 14a-11 does not implicate 
commercial speech, which has been defined as “advertisements that 
‘[do] no more than propose a commercial transaction.’”43  
Commercial speech is often reviewed by reference to the audience, 
rather than the speaker, and has been protected when the audience 
consists of consumers entitled to know the “truth” from companies.44  
Rule 14a-11’s replacement rule would not be directed at consumers, 
but rather at shareholders.45  Rule 14a-11’s replacement, therefore, 
would not be commercial speech and thus would not be subject to a 
lower standard of review. 
Similarly, the idea that the “comprehensive regulation of . . . 
securities” subjects speech about corporate governance to less First 
Amendment protection is not sufficient to exempt the Rule from 
strict scrutiny.46  Although the Supreme Court has upheld the 
Commission’s regulation of speech concerning securities,47 courts 
have delineated that only “[s]peech relating to the purchase and 
sale of securities” is subject to lesser First Amendment scrutiny.48  Rule 
                                                          
 42. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001) (“We 
have used standards for determining the validity of speech regulations which accord 
less protection to commercial speech than to other expression.”).  
 43. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 790 (1985) 
(quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376, 385 (1973)); see also United Foods, 533 U.S. at 409 (noting that commercial 
speech occurs when one “propose[s] a commercial transaction”). 
 44. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 567–
68 (1980) (holding that corporations have the right to propose commercial 
transactions and advertise because consumers have the right to the information, not 
because of corporate personhood); see also Adam Winkler, Corporate Personhood and 
the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 868 (2007) (explaining that, 
in commercial speech cases, the “identity of the speaker [is] more or less ignored”). 
 45. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674–77 (Sept. 16, 2010) (summarizing the 
Commission’s finalized rule). 
 46. See SEC v. Wall Street Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 373 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (noting that the First Amendment does not limit regulation in “areas of 
extensive economic supervision, such as the securities, antitrust and transportation 
fields” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Commission 
argued that, because the rule purports to regulate securities, it should be subjected 
to a less stringent First Amendment analysis than strict scrutiny.  Brief for 
Respondent at 64–65, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-1305), 2011 WL 2014799, at *64–65.  
 47. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 758 n.5 (explaining that the 
government is permitted to regulate securities and corporate proxy statements, as 
well as commercial speech). 
 48. See Wall Street, 851 F.2d at 373 (noting that the government’s authority to 
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14a-11, however, did not address the purchase and sale of securities.  
Rather, the rule addressed shareholder proxy access.  Accordingly, it 
was not within the scope of the Commission’s authority to regulate 
speech.49  The proxy access rule would regulate the content of the 
information disseminated, rather than merely ensuring dissemination 
of information to ordinary citizens, which is the Commission’s 
primary function and reason for creation.50  The D.C. Circuit has 
stated that it would be “impermissibl[e]” for the Commission to “be 
drawn into the arena encompassing content regulation” of speech.51 
Rule 14a-11 does not simply require additional disclosure from the 
company; it forces the company to publish a third party’s view.  One 
could argue that because the shareholders own a stake in the 
company, they are associated with the company and are not third 
parties.  Although the shareholders own the corporation’s securities, 
they do not own the corporation.52  This is a subtle but essential 
difference.  Because the corporation itself is a legal entity,53 and 
because a shareholder is not authorized to act on behalf of the 
corporation,54 it follows that the shareholder and the company are 
not the same person within the eyes of the law.  Consequently, the 
speech of a shareholder is not the same as the speech of a 
corporation,55 and shareholder speech is therefore third-party speech. 
                                                          
regulate speech pertaining to the purchase and sale of securities is “at least as broad” 
as its authority to regulate commercial speech). 
 49. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,723 
(mentioning selling and purchasing of securities only with regards to reporting 
requirements of section 5(b) of schedule 14A). 
 50. The Commission strives to provide “all investors, whether large institutions or 
private individuals, [with] access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to 
buying it.”  The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).  The Commission was created after the 
Great Crash of 1929, when it was estimated that over half of the securities sold to 
people were fraudulent.  Id.  The Commission was created to “restore investor 
confidence in . . . capital markets by providing investors and the markets with more 
reliable information and clear rules of honest dealing.”  Id. 
 51. Wall Street, 851 F.2d at 375. 
 52. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Imagining the Intangible, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
965, 1007 (2009) (noting that securities give shareholders rights to the profits and 
assets of the company, but not to the company itself). 
 53. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate 
Form:  A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 
773–74 (2005) (asserting that the notion of the corporation as a legal person dates 
back to the Roman empire). 
 54. See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
377, 438 (2004) (noting that, unlike partnerships, shareholders “are not agents of 
the corporation,” “cannot cause the corporation to incur liabilities,” and “are not 
liable for the debts of their corporation”). 
 55. Cf. Janus Capital Grp., Inc., v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302–
04 (2011) (holding that a mutual fund can “make” a statement independently of its 
shareholders or directors). 
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B. Rule 14a-11 Does Not Serve a Compelling Interest 
To survive strict scrutiny, the rule must serve a compelling 
interest.56  A compelling interest is one that is crucial or necessary, 
not just preferable.57  A Rule 14a-11-type requirement, however, 
would guarantee mandatory proxy access, which is not necessary, and 
some argue is not even desirable.58  In its final brief to the D.C. 
Circuit, the Commission described its “substantial interest in assuring 
that the federally regulated proxy process more closely approximates 
the in-person shareholders’ meeting by facilitating shareholders’ 
exercise of their state-law rights to nominate and elect members of 
the board.”59  The Commission’s brief, however, made no mention of 
a “compelling interest.”60  “Compelling interest” is a term of art,61 and 
by failing to categorize its interest as the type necessary under strict 
scrutiny, the Commission hurt its constitutional argument. 
Additionally, the Commission cannot have a compelling interest in 
a 14a-11-type rule because forcing a company to associate with the 
views of third parties violates a basic principle that legal persons 
cannot “be an instrument for fostering . . . an ideological point of 
view” they find “unacceptable.”62  Additionally, such a rule would 
conflict with Supreme Court decisions rejecting the “mandated 
support” of “speech by others”63 by forcing companies to publish 
speech that potentially conflicts with their views. 
Moreover, an order that is not content-neutral would not further 
the government interest of promoting speech by making a variety of 
viewpoints available.64  A 14a-11-type rule could not serve a 
                                                          
 56. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 817 (2000) 
(applying strict scrutiny to laws that merely burden speech in the same manner as to 
those that completely restrict speech). 
 57. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (examining cases where courts have 
defined a “compelling interest” as something necessary or crucial). 
 58. See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich, D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Proxy Access Rules, 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION (July 22, 2011, 4:36 PM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/ 
2011/07/22/d-c-circuit-strikes-down-proxy-access-rules/ (arguing that proxy access is 
not only unnecessary, but indeed is not even helpful). 
 59. Brief for Respondent, supra note 46, at 67. 
 60. See id. at 66–67. 
 61. Lino A. Graglia, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye:  Of Animal Sacrifice and 
Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 n.81 (1996). 
 62. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (invalidating the 
requirement that New Hampshire residents could not cover “Live Free or Die” on 
their license plates). 
 63. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001). 
 64. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 20 (1986) 
(providing that inhibiting one side’s expression at the expense of another means the 
content is not neutral); see also Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 
530, 536 (1980) (declaring that, when the government regulates speech based on its 
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compelling interest because it is not neutral in “exposing” individuals 
“to a variety of viewpoints.”65  Similar to the requirement invalidated 
in Pacific Gas, where a state utilities commission ordered the utility 
company to place a third party’s newsletter in its billing envelopes,66 
Rule 14a-11 attempted to require companies to place the information 
supporting director nominations of third parties in proxy statements 
to shareholders.67  The mandated enclosure was not “neutral” in 
either instance because each disclosure necessarily entailed 
publishing opinions of persons “who disagree with [the company’s] 
views as expressed.”68  Had the D.C. Circuit addressed the 
constitutional issue in Business Roundtable, like the requirement in 
Pacific Gas, the court would likely have found Rule 14a-11 
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny—as the court would any 
replacement for this rule. 
C. Rule 14a-11 is Not Narrowly Tailored or Less Restrictive Than 
Alternative Means 
Any subsequent 14a-11-type rule would not be narrowly tailored 
because less restrictive means exist for achieving the government’s 
purpose.69  The original rule is not narrowly tailored because it 
necessarily includes all public corporations in its scope.70  Previously 
proposed proxy access rule amendments, for example, required 
certain “triggers” that may have demonstrated an objective need for 
                                                          
subject matter, the regulation “slips from . . . neutrality . . . into a concern about 
content,” and is more likely to be unconstitutional (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 65. Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 20.  
 66. Id. at 5–7. 
 67. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 
9136, Exchange Act Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 
29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,674–77 (Sept. 16, 2010). 
 68. Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 13. 
 69. E.g., Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1183 (9th Cir. 
2007) (determining that the definition of “contribution” was narrowly tailored 
because it “(1) promote[d] a substantial government interest that would be achieved 
less effectively absent the regulation, and (2) [did] not burden substantially more 
speech than is necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Human 
Life of Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010); Fraternal Order of 
Police v. Stenehjem, 431 F.3d 591, 599 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that a statute 
excluding professional solicitors from an exemption of charitable organizations 
being blocked on do-not-call lists was narrowly tailored because it applied only to 
unwilling residents); Int’l Caucus of Labor Comms. v. City of Montgomery, 111 F.3d 
1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1997) (determining that a ban on distributing political 
literature from tables on sidewalks was narrowly tailored to fit the municipality’s 
interest in keeping public pathways obstruction free). 
 70. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,679–80 
(explaining the reasoning behind, and consequences of, including a no “opt out” 
provision in the Commission’s final rule). 
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increased proxy access.71  In contrast, Rule 14a-11 applies to all 
companies—except those that have debt securities registered under 
Section 12 of the Exchange Act—and does not allow companies to 
opt out of Rule 14a-11’s requirements.72 
Other less restrictive possibilities exist to achieve the government’s 
interest of increasing proxy access.  One such example would be for 
the Commission to rely on the amendment to Rule 14a-8.73  The 
amendment changes Rule 14a-8(i) so that companies may no longer 
rely on Rule 14a-8(i) to exclude a shareholder proposal to establish a 
procedure in the governing documents guaranteeing proxy access for 
one or more shareholders.74  This technique still satisfies the 
Commission’s overall goal—to have increased shareholder proxy 
access—but only imposes it on corporations where shareholders elect 
to utilize such a rule.75  Because the Commission is concerned about 
shareholders having sufficient proxy access, the Commission should 
implement a mechanism to ensure that shareholders can propose 
and adopt a bylaw that would require companies to publish 
shareholder proxy materials.76 
                                                          
 71. Compare Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 
48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,789–92 
(proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (triggering events include (1) a majority of outstanding 
shares authorizes requiring shareholder nominations to be published with proxy 
materials, and (2) shareholders representing at least thirty-five percent of the votes 
withhold authority on their proxy cards for their shares to be voted for a director), 
with Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,680–81 
(defending the decision not to include triggering events based on the concern that 
inclusion would add unnecessary complexity and impede shareholders’ abilities to 
nominate and elect directors in all companies, not just those with demonstrated 
governance issues).  But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC’s Shareholder 
Access Proposal, ENGAGE, Apr. 2004, at 18, 24 (positing that the presence of triggering 
events would still not narrowly tailor a proposed rule because “nothing in either [of 
the SEC’s proposed] trigger[s] limits the rule to the Enrons of the world”).  
 72. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,671–74 
(explaining that, despite the split in comments suggesting that a “one size fits all” 
approach will not work, the Commission decided not to allow companies to exempt 
themselves from Rule 14a-11 regulation).  
 73. See id. at 56,730 (detailing the proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8). 
 74. Id. at 56,731–32. 
 75. See id. at 56,677–80 (indicating that the changes are intended to “facilitate 
the effective exercise of shareholders’ traditional State law rights to nominate and 
elect directors to company boards of directors”). 
 76. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (describing when a company must include 
shareholder proposals in the company’s proxy statements); see also Robert J. Jackson, 
Jr., SEC Strengthens Shareholders’ Role in Corporate Political Speech Decisions, HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 15, 
2011, 11:04 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/05/15/sec-
strengthens-shareholders’-role-in-corporate-political-speech-decisions/ (advocating 
to increase shareholder power over the board to include things such as veto power 
over political campaign contribution decisions).  But see Charles M. Nathan, A 12-Step 
Program to Truly Good Corporate Governance, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (May 18, 2011, 9:26 AM), 
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Rule 14a-8 provides this mechanism by allowing shareholders to 
propose mandatory proxy access provisions for the company in which 
they hold stock.77  Rule 14a-11, conversely, forces mandatory proxy 
access on all companies without providing an out.78  This is inapposite 
with a principal tenet of business law:  shareholders should not be 
coerced into adopting provisions.79  Consequently, a new 14a-11-type 
rule would not be narrowly tailored because it would encompass all 
public companies without providing an out, would not be targeted at 
only those companies in need of increased proxy access, and would 
not be the least restrictive means available to the Commission to 
achieve its desired goals. 
CONCLUSION 
Due to Dodd-Frank, the Commission will continue to be 
exceptionally busy for the foreseeable future, stretching its already 
thin resources to the breaking point.80  During a time when there is so 
much else to do,81 the Commission should not waste time and 
resources by pursuing a recalibration of Rule 14a-11.  Any mandatory 
                                                          
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2011/05/18/a-12-step-program-to-truly-
good-corporate-governance/ (arguing that expanded shareholder access reduces 
economic value to the average shareholder by allowing corporate governance and 
social accountability activists to distract board members from their true objective of 
maximizing shareholder wealth). 
 77. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (explaining how a shareholder can include a 
proposal in a company’s proxy card and listing circumstances where the company 
may exclude the shareholder’s proposal). 
 78. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,679–80. 
 79. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387–88 (Del. 1995) 
(invalidating anti-takeover measures because they are “preclusive” and “coercive” 
with regards to shareholders). 
 80. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting that the Commission has 
been forced to devote too many resources to complying with Dodd-Frank). 
 81. For instance, the SEC is working on developing the rules to get a 
consolidated audit trail (CAT) system in place that will collect equity stock trading 
information in real time.  This will be more efficient by allowing for SEC staff 
members previously encumbered by bluesheeting (the process of collecting equity 
stock trading information) to spend more time analyzing the data than collecting it.  
See Scott Patterson, SEC Pushes Plan for Audit System, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904491704576574883908453622.h
tml.  Additionally, the SEC has recently come under fire for settling too quickly and 
for too little with companies thought to have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.  
See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387, 2011 WL 5903733, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011) (rejecting SEC proposed settlement with Citigroup because 
recent SEC policy of settling cases without requiring the accused company to either 
admit or deny the agency’s allegations does not satisfy the law).  It has been 
suggested that the lighter stance taken against some of the biggest firms involved 
with the financial meltdown has been due to an agency stretched too thin and 
lacking the necessary capacities to fight against the Goliath corporations.  See Times 
Topics:  Securities and Exchange Commission, NYTIMES.COM, http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/reference/timestopics/organizations/s/securities_and_exchange_commission/i
ndex.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2012). 
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proxy access rule will necessarily fail strict scrutiny, which must be 
applied because such a rule would regulate the content of 
corporations’ speech.  Because a mandatory proxy access rule does 
not serve a compelling government interest, is not narrowly tailored, 
and is not the least restrictive means for achieving that interest, a 
recalibration of Rule 14a-11—even if able to overcome the 
procedural defects outlined by the court in Business Roundtable v. 
SEC—will still fail strict scrutiny.  The mandates of Dodd-Frank 
already require tremendous resources from the Commission.  
Because of the obstacles it faces, the Commission should abandon a 
mandatory proxy access rule and focus its attention on other projects 
and problems, such as upgrading market surveillance technology and 
remaining tough on rule-breakers. 
